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The rapid spread of, and devastation caused by, Covid-19 worldwide reflects not only its 
viral properties, but the dichotomy between a globalised world profoundly connected by 
trade and travel and the absence of global solidarity and coordination in the response to 
the pandemic. Challenging a rising disengagement from multilateral governance, the UN 
Secretary General, the World Health Organisation (WHO), and the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) have all called for global solidarity and 
international assistance and cooperation to be at the heart of the Covid-19 response.1 In 
this paper, we explore what this means for global health, giving particular attention to two 
core components of global health law that provide legally binding obligations regarding 
Covid-19: the commitments to global governance under the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) and obligations of international assistance and cooperation towards the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to health, under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Situating the 
global pandemic response in the context of the contemporaneous decline of 
multilateralism, our article takes a critical look at the international institutions and 
frameworks and their role during pandemic responses, and the imperative of a more 
cosmopolitan approach to global governance, embracing solidarity and international 
cooperation in a way that serves low-income countries and rights holders everywhere.  
 
II. The Rise and Fall of Multilateralism in Global Health 
 
Institutions of global health and human rights have brought the world together in 
unprecedented cooperation since the end of World War II. The rise of multilateralism in 
global health reflects the broader cosmopolitan worldview that gave birth to global 
governance in the aftermath of World War II, embedding global solidarity and cooperation 
within an increasingly interconnected world. Beginning in the nineteenth century, the 
spread of infectious disease began to unify states in shared vulnerability, with international 
cooperation recognised as necessary to prevent disease transmission through regulatory 
coordination, with early efforts to control specific infectious disease outbreaks evolving to 
become a standing international public health bureaucracy through WHO.2 The WHO 
broadest and most liberal concept of international responsibility for health ever officially 
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global vision for the WHO has been undermined by the rising reluctance of States to 
adequately support global health governance, a reluctance driven by the resurrection of 
nationalism.  
 
In a direct attack on the shared goals of a globalising world, nationalism has spurred 
isolationism and has sought to retrench nations inwards. Right-wing populists have directly 
challenged multilateral institutions, including those in the area of global health and human 
rights. Some nations have retrenched and withdrawn from multilateral partnerships and 
international organisations. For example, nationalist governments have withdrawn from 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in recent years,4 and the USA 
government, seeing health and human rights as oppositional to traditional nationalist 
values, has slashed funding to the United Nations Population Fund and other institutions 
of global governance.5 These right-wing nationalist governments have further attacked 
human rights, undermining the global work of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) whilst turning increasingly autocratic through attacks on minority 
populations, independent media outlets, and civil society organizations.6  Such counter-
cosmopolitan retrenchment is leading to a rejection in some quarters of global governance 
and human rights as a basis for global health, threatening progress that has been made, 
jeopardising the health and human rights of vulnerable populations worldwide and raising 
obstacles to future institutional progress.7 This new global order, detached from the 
science of public health and the obligations of human rights, is the context into which 
Covid-19 emerged. The response to the pandemic is illustrative of the nationalist tenor, 
undermining global health and human rights through a rejection of multilateralism. 
 
 III. The Emergence of Covid-19 into a Nationalist World 
 
The rapidity and scale of transmission of Covid-19 is testimony to the enduring nature of 
our shared global vulnerability in an increasingly interconnected and globalised world.  
However, many State responses have shunned transboundary cooperation.  While still in 
the early stages of this devastating pandemic, such actions not only exert negative 
repercussions on global public health and well-being; in impeding (and at times 
undermining) multilateralism, they also risk rebounding on nations by inhibiting coordinated 
strategies to address a virus that has no respect for national borders. For example, in 
responding to this emergency, States have adopted widespread unilateral travel 
restrictions in an attempt to interrupt transmission. Amounting to a violation of the IHR, the 
WHO has cautioned that they also have a perverse public health effect by diverting action 
away from health system and surveillance preparation. Undercutting the foundations of a 
human rights-based world, these nationalist actions have broader consequences on health 
and livelihoods worldwide by undercutting a collective response through compromising the 
global movement of essential medical supplies and personnel to fight the pandemic, as 
well as undermining humanitarian assistance more broadly  and causing economic 
disruptions.8 With an unmet burden of need for medical equipment, as well as protective 
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clothing for frontline staff, and with spiralling costs, countries have turned to an agenda of 
self-reliance and protectionist curbs on exports. Even as states recognize that the 
pandemic will not come to an end without an effective and universally-shared vaccine, 
some states have continued to take nationalist approaches to vaccine development and 
distribution.9 Such approaches create particular anxieties in terms of the equitable 
distribution of a future vaccine, 
available to all.10  
 
At the same time, multilateralism has been undermined by the failure of some States, 
particularly the most powerful, to engage with those institutions best-placed to mount a 
multilateral and coordinated response. The Government of China received widespread 
condemnation for suppressing information about Covid-19 in the weeks after its 
emergence, where Chinese efforts to conceal a disease outbreak from WHO (to limit 
domestic economic damage) harmed the ability of the world to prepare for a pandemic 
under the International Health Regulations.11 
unjustified withdrawal of funding from the WHO,12 driven by domestic political 
considerations, is denying the organisation vital resources when they are most needed to 
coordinate a global response, as well as to maintain its other vital programmes across the 
world. This US action has emboldened other countries to neglect global solidarity in the 
face of the pandemic, with Brazil now also threatening to withhold funding from WHO,13 as 
the European Union (EU) and UK squabble over the British financial contribution to the 
14 Such financial wrangling is undermining cooperative 
health efforts: as the pandemic took hold, the EU mounted an initially weak public health 
response as its member states, overwhelmed by the quickly escalating crisis, focused on 
domestic responses.15 Perhaps most disturbingly, the US has continued to block the 
passage of a Security Council resolution calling for a global ceasefire to support delivery 
of aid in the context of Covid-19 to conflict regions which are particularly vulnerable.16  
 
With nationalist responses predominating, their practical ramifications for the well-being 
paradox in that they have undermined not only global health governance, but also national 
self-interest  linking national security with global solidarity. These linkages are a stark 
reminder of the original goals, and continued relevance, of global health law as a 
foundation of multilateral governance in the Covid-19 response.    
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IV. Global Health Law   
 
As globalisation has presented challenges to national disease prevention and health 
promotion efforts, global health law, offering the promise of addressing transboundary 
health challenges and promoting global health with justice,17 describes evolving 
multilateral efforts to address: 
  
 New health threats  including non-communicable disease, injuries, mental 
health, dangerous products, and other globalised health threats, 
 New health actors  including transnational corporations, private philanthropists, 
civil society, and other non-state actors, and 
 New health norms  
global justice, and other normative standards of global health policy.18 
 
Global health law instruments codify public health obligations across the global health 
landscape, seeking to realise both global health and human rights within and among 
nations through a multilateral response. Yet, global health law has been challenged by the 
Covid-19, with State responses falling short of global health law obligations. The scale and 
nature of the crisis has led for calls for strengthening and reform of the multilateral laws 
and institutions of global health. 
 
d) Global Health Governance: The International Health Regulations 
 
Drawing from the long history of international health law, the 1946 WHO Constitution 
provided WHO with the multilateral authority to propose conventions, regulations, and 
recommendations on any public health matter  with regulations, once adopted by the 
World Health Assembly, automatically binding on all WHO member states unless explicitly 
rejected. With this broad international legal authority to regulate public health, WHO 
assumed governance over the International Sanitary Regulations (1951); yet, with their 
revision and consolidation into the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 1969, the 
scope of these provisions was limited to only three select diseases (cholera, plague, and 
yellow fever). As the world faced a continuous stream of emerging and re-emerging 
diseases, the principal international legal instrument for preventing, detecting, and 
responding to infectious disease outbreaks was increasingly seen as inadequate.19   
  
The 2005 revision of the IHR sought to codify a contemporary global health governance 
system under WHO  to prevent, protect against, control, and respond to the international 
spread of infectious disease through public health measures that avoid unnecessary 
interference with international traffic and trade.20 States bear an obligation under the IHR 
to notify the WHO within 24 hours of all detected events within their territory which may 
constitute a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), which is any 
extraordinary event which is determined to: 
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1) constitute a public health risk to other states and 
2) potentially require a coordinated international response.  
 
Based upon information received from both state and non-state sources (e.g., media, civil 
society, and other states), the WHO Director-General has the authority to determine 
whether an event constitutes a PHEIC.21  This PHEIC declaration has since been employed 
by WHO six times to control the international spread of infectious disease  most recently 
in the ongoing global struggle against Covid-19.22 
  
However, the Covid-19 pandemic has brought into sharp focus the limitations of the IHR 
in (1) reporting public health risks to WHO; (2) declaring a PHEIC where necessary to the 
international response; (3) coordinating national responses commensurate with public 
health risks; and (4) supporting national capacity for infectious disease control. 
 
understand the scope of the threat and coordinate the public health response. Legitimate 
questions remain as to what Chinese authorities knew, when they learned it, and whether 
manner in accordance with the IHR.23 Since the IHR does not give WHO unilateral 
authority to investigate events independently, it must continue 
support.   
 
China notified WHO of this potential threat on 31 December 2019, but even with this 
notification, the IHR did not facilitate the timely declaration of a PHEIC. With inadequate 
reporting and a split in expert opinion, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom 
Ghebreyesus convened an Expert Committee on three occasions in late January 2020 to 
advise on the declaration of a PHEIC.24 A PHEIC was finally declared on 30 January 2020, 
by which point the coronavirus was well on its way to becoming a pandemic. Global health 
25 
however, WHO has remained hesitant to exercise its authority to declare a PHEIC, 
apprehensive of a declaration that could devastate the economies of powerful states, and 
this reticence has delayed global preparations for a pandemic.   
 
Following the PHEIC declaration, states have responded in contravention of WHO 
guidance26 with overwhelming restrictions on international traffic, individual rights, and 
temporary recommendations and other IHR parameters, states are permitted to deviate 
from WHO guidance in only limited circumstances: where the different measures achieve 
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they are based on scientific principles, and are not more invasive to persons nor more 
restrictive of international traffic than reasonably available alternatives, and implemented 
with full respect for human rights.27 However, a number of countries rapidly implemented 
violative health measures including traveller restrictions, flight suspensions, visa 
restrictions, and border closures bringing the world to a standstill.28    
 
Further undermining the IHR through these nationalistic measures, states are actively 
undercutting global solidarity by sidelining their common and shared responsibility to 
public health capacities to detect and respond to outbreaks.29 Neglecting the IHR duty of 
international assistance, states have taken advantage of these ambiguities to limit, at their 
own peril, their field of vision to national frontiers and neglect their international 
responsibilities. This nationalistic short-sightedness amidst the Covid-19 pandemic is 
exposing the majority of the world to the threat of staggering humanitarian upheaval, 
economic instability, and health insecurity.   
 
e) Human Rights Governance: The ICESCR 
  
In addressing a global pandemic, international human rights law is uniquely placed in that 
it comprises a legally binding set of universally applicable norms to guide an equitable and 
effective response by States to Covid-19. The central place of human rights for pandemic 
responses is duly reflected in the IHR, which embed human rights at the heart of its 
approach to infectious disease prevention, control and treatment. International human 
rights law supports multilateralism for global health because it provides a shared and 
legally binding framework for action among States as well as recognising duties for other 
actors, and because it gives rise to multilateral and global obligations, as well as individual 
and domestic obligations, for the right to health.  
 
Like global health governance, international human rights governance emerged at the 
conclusion of World War II, and is equally infused with ambitions of global solidarity and a 
cosmopolitan outlook. The Charter of the United Nations includes a commitment by 
member states to take joint and separate action for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedom on the basis of non-discrimination and equality.30 The Universal 
through international 
cooperation to economic, social and cultural rights.31 Translating this vision into 
internationally binding obligations on States, the ICESCR (and subsequent international 
human rights treaties) have given rise to an obligation of international assistance and 
cooperation on States to realise economic, social and cultural rights, which include the 
rights to health, to an adequate standard of living and to the enjoyment of the benefits of 
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28 te the International Health Regulations During the COVID-
(2020) 395 Lancet 664. 
29 WHO, International Health Regulations, (2005) Art. 44, para. 1(a). 
30 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, articles 55 and 56. 
31 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III). 
science.32 These rights give rise to obligations on States parties to take steps not only at 
the domestic level but also through international assistance and cooperation for, amongst 
33  
 
Because persistent poverty and global inequity (reinforced by the actions and 
arrangements of globalised institutions) hinder low-income State governments from fully 
realising the right to health of their people without foreign resources, international 
obligations of assistance and cooperation provide a means to call on the international 
community for cooperation and assistance in realising the right to health.  The international 
community thus becomes a duty-bearer under the right to health, responsible for 
respecting, protecting, and fulfilling all the economic, social, and cultural rights that underlie 
health through coordinated, legally accountable responses.34 As clarified by the CESCR, 
this international assistance and cooperation requires a range of actions from States in the 
context of Covid-19, including: sharing of research, medical equipment and supplies, and 
best practices in combating the virus; coordinated action to reduce the economic and social 
impacts of the crisis; and joint endeavours by all States to ensure an effective, equitable 
economic recovery. 35  
export of medical equipment, that result in obstructing access to vital equipment for the 
36 and refraining from unilateral border measures 
that hinder the flow of necessary and essential goods, particular staple foods and health 
equipment ,37 as well as lifting sanctions that interfere with medical equipment 
procurement, debt relief and the use of flexibilities under international trade law to allow 
universal access to diagnostics, medicines and vaccines.38     
 
Whilst not naming all specific international institutions and initiatives, the CESCR 
Statement is indicative of the variety of global health governance institutions and laws that 
provide pathways for global cooperation and solidarity, grounded in human rights, to 
effectively and equitably address Covid-19. The central role of the WHO is recognised in 
global health governance; yet, looking across the global governance landscape, States 
39 and promote 
flexibilities in the World Trade Organisat to allow universal 
access to the benefits of scientific advancements relating to Covid-19 such as diagnostics, 
40   
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Further, the UN has established a range of global initiatives that are intended to facilitate 
global solidarity for health in responses, providing new pathways for multilateral 
cooperation, most notably: a Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan, led by the 
WHO;41 a Global Humanitarian Response Plan, led by the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, particularly focused in the 63 countries facing a humanitarian or 
refugee crisis;42 and the UN Socio-economic Framework, led by the UN Development 
Program to mitigate the social and economic impact of Covid-19.43 Yet beyond these 
important, forward looking examples of multilateral governance for global health, as shown 
by examples highlighted above, including actions to protect and preserve vaccines for 
domestic populations,44 the withholding of scientific knowledge and funds from the WHO, 
45  and travel restrictions,46 States responses appear to conflict with their obligations under 
the ICESCR. 
 
These failures of compliance are indicative of a broader disconnect between the valuable 
normative framework of international human rights law for more equitable global health 
responses through international assistance and cooperation, and a range of shortcomings 
that militate against the realisation of this vision.47 The obligation on States of international 
assistance and cooperation is contested, with high income countries approaching it as a 
moral, rather than a legally binding obligation.48 Further, while exerting binding legal 
obligations on States, international human rights law does not directly bind other important 
global health actors, including the private sector and philanthropic organisations, which 
have important roles to play in the context of Covid-19. The CESCR and other human 
rights actors support legally binding obligations on international organisations such as the 
International Financial Institutions, but this position is strongly contested by those 
organisations.49 Further, despite a range of global accountability procedures, State 
compliance with international human rights law is often weak.50 The challenges of Covid-
19 for human rights across borders illustrate why scholars have called for a rethinking of 
international human rights, as well as other global health governance institutions, including 
the IHR,51 to render them fit for purpose to effectively address global challenges, 
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stakeholders and relationships that determine the enjoyment of economic, social and 




Covid-19 is a global public health crisis that calls for global solidarity and coordinated 
action, yet many States have responded with nationalist approaches that ignore the need 
for collective action in facing this common threat. With infectious diseases providing the 
original impetus for the global cooperation in health, Covid-19 is a reminder of why global 
solidarity must be preserved and enhanced, including through strengthening global 
institutions to oversee a robust response.  Following this unprecedented pandemic 
response, global health law will need to be revised to reflect the weaknesses highlighted 
by the Covid-19 pandemic and the need for global solidarity in facing future threats  
bringing together human rights law with global health governance.   
 
Over time, however, we are witnessing some movements towards cooperation and 
solidarity. With UN-led initiatives being established, countries including the UK and China 
lion was raised at an EU-hosted virtual 
pledging conference to fund the development of Covid-19 vaccines. Further, the African 
Union and African Centres for Disease Control and Prevention have been praised for 
collaborative efforts.53 However, much more is needed, particularly more financing, for 
vaccine development, the global distribution of treatment and diagnostics for Covid-19, 
and to support both national and global responses to and preparedness for the 
pandemic.54  
 
Multilateral efforts remain a crucial health and human rights imperative, and States must 
continue to build up their international assistance and cooperation obligations under 
international human rights law, as well as their obligations under the International Health 
Regulations.  As policymakers increasingly recognise that this pandemic will only truly end 
with the development of an effective vaccine, human rights obligations at the intersection 
of the right to health and the right to benefit from scientific progress international 
assistance and cooperation will be crucial in progressively realising universal access to 
the necessary benefits of this scientific breakthrough, bringing the world together to assure 
the highest attainable standard of health for all. 
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